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Nelson v. Campbell
124 S. Ct. 2117 (2004)
I. Facts
In October 1978 a jury convicted David L. Nelson of the capital murder of
Wilson Thompson and sentenced Nelson to death.' Upon the State's motion,
on September 3, 2003, the Supreme Court of Alabama set Nelson's execution
date for October 9, 2003.2 From the time the trial court sentenced Nelson
through the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision
to affirm his sentence, Alabama's method of execution was electrocution.3 In
July 2002 Alabama changed its default method of execution to lethal injection
and gave condemned defendants the choice of electrocution upon thirty days
written notice.4 Nelson did not make a timely request for execution by electrocu-
tion; therefore, the State planned to execute Nelson by lethal injection.5
After examining Nelson on September 10, 2003, a nurse at the Holman
Correctional Facility, the execution site, discovered that Nelson's veins were
compromised.6 The Warden then informed Nelson that the staff needed to
make a "0.5-inch incision in petitioner's arm and catheterize a vein 24 hours
before the scheduled execution" to perform tie lethal injection.7 About a month
later, six days before the execution date, the Warden informed Nelson that it
would be necessary to make a two-inch incision in his arm or leg one hour before
the execution using local anesthesia ("cut-down procedure") in order to access
Nelson's veins.8
1. Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Nelson's petition for habeas relief after a series of state and
federal habeas appeals involving the trial court's failure to question Nelson about his decision to
proceed pro se. Nelson, 292 F.3d at 1293-94; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)
(quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)) (instructing a court to ascertain whether
a defendant is " 'knowingly and intelligently'" waiving his right to proceed with counsel).
2. Nelson v. Campbell, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2121 (2004).
3. Id. at 2120; see ALA. CODE § 15-18-82(a) (1995) (requiring death sentences to be carried
out by electrocution).
4. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2120; see ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1 (Supp. 2003) (requiring the State
to execute defendants sentenced to death by lethal injection unless they opt for electrocution).
5. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2120-21.
6. Id. at 2121.
7. Id.
8. Id. Additionally, the Warden could not assure Nelson that a physician would be present
during the cut-down procedure. Id.
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The following Monday, three days before the execution date, Nelson filed
a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 asserting that the cut-down procedure
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.9 Nelson sought, intera/ia, a temporary stay of
his execution and a permanent injunction barring the Commissioner of the
Alabama Department of Corrections from using the cut-down procedure." The
district court dismissed Nelson's claim on the grounds that he should have filed
the claim as a second habeas corpus petition subject to the highly restrictive
gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)." The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal and added that Nelson's claim did not satisfy the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because he did not show that" "but for the
purported Eighth Amendment violation, no reasonable fact finder would have
found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.' "12
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision
and remanded the questions of whether to enjoin the Warden from using the cut-
down procedure and whether to grant a temporary stay on Nelson's execution.'
3
The Court held that Nelson could challenge the Alabama cut-down procedure
using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that he did not have to file the claim as a habeas
corpus petition.' The Court noted that Nelson could invoke § 1983 if the cut-
down procedure was an unnecessary part of the execution. 5 If the cut-down
procedure was necessary in order to execute Nelson, however, then the district
court would need to determine whether the claim was cognizable under § 1983.6
9. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) ("Every person
who, under color of any statute... causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to
the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law...."). Attached to the complaint was an affidavit from Dr. Mark Heath
stating that the cut-down procedures are very painful and dangerous and that less painful alterna-
tives are available. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2121-22.
10. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2121.
11. Id. at 2122; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000) (instructing a court to dismiss a new claim
raised in a successive habeas corpus petition unless the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional
law, or the petitioner could not have previously discovered a piece of evidence, and the evidence
as a whole is such that no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the offense).
12. Nelson v. Campbell, 347 F.3d 910, 912 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
2244(b) (2) (B) (ii)).
13. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2124-26.
14. Id. at 2120.
15. Id at 2124-25.




A. Availabii of 42 U.S.C f 1983
The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections argued that
Nelson's claim challenged "the fact of his conviction or the duration of his
sentence."' 7 The Supreme Court acknowledged that a prisoner must bring a
"fact or duration" claim by means of a habeas corpus petition, even if it may be
cognizable under § 1983."8 Nelson claimed, however, that he was only challeng-
ing the conditions of his confinement, and that as such, he did not need to file
his claim as a habeas corpus petition.' 9 The Court agreed that a claim challenging
the conditions of confinement is cognizable under § 1983, but concluded that
Nelson's claim was neither a "fact or duration" challenge nor a "conditions of
incarceration" challenge.'
The Court held that a petitioner may use § 1983 to challenge the constitu-
tionality of an unnecessary part of a lethal injection procedure.21 The Court
limited its holding to claims challenging unnecessary execution procedures and
did not rule on whether a prisoner may use § 1983 to challenge a method of
execution in general.2 The Court determined that inquiry into whether a proce-
dure is necessary may include whether the procedure is statutorily mandated,
whether it is physically necessary in order to perform the lethal injection, and
whether acceptable alternative procedures exist.' The Court based its reasoning
on its previous holdings that a prisoner may only bring a civil rights damage
action under § 1983 if the claim does not necessarily challenge the "fact or
duration" of the prisoner's sentence.24 Thus, Nelson's claim was proper under
§ 1983, provided that Alabama could execute Nelson by lethal injection without
the cut-down procedure. 21 The Court remanded the issue of whether the cut-
down procedure was necessary. 26
17. Id at 2122.
18. Id (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)).
19. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2122.
20. Id at 2123 (citing Muhammed v. Close, 124 S. Ct. 1303, 1304 (2004)).
21. Id at 2124.
22. Id
23. Id at 2123-24.
24. Id at 2124-25 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
25. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
26. Id; see also Brief of Amie, Curiae Laurie Dill, M.D. et al. at 7-8, Nelson v. Campbell, 124
S. Ct. 2117 (2004) (No. 03-6821) (discussing alternative methods for gaining intravenous access of
condemned prisoners with compromised veins).
2004]
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B. Temporary Stay of Exection
Nelson requested a temporary stay of execution, but did not condition the
request on Alabama's need to use the cut-down procedure.27 In a warning to
Nelson about the broadness of his request, the Court stated that a proper request
would have included the condition. 21 If Nelson resubmitted a similarly broad
request on remand, the Court instructed the district court to address whether
such a broad request converts an otherwise viable § 1983 claim into a claim
cognizable only in federal habeas proceedings.29 The Court was concerned that
such a broad request challenged the sentence as a whole.3° However, the Court
did not rule on whether Nelson's broad request turned his claim into the func-
tional equivalent of a habeas corpus petition because the previous stay on Nel-
son's execution had expired and the State had not rescheduled the execution.31
Thus, the Court stated that the district court would only need to rule on Nelson's
request for a stay if the State rescheduled the execution prior to the district
court's proceedings. 3
The Court gave some guidance to courts ruling on whether to grant a stay
of execution pending the decision of a § 1983 claim.33 The Court cited GomeZ v.
United States District Cour 3 4 for the proposition that the filing of a § 1983 claim
does not necessarily entitle the petitioner to a stay of execution.3" The Court
listed three factors for courts to consider in deciding whether to grant a stay: (1)
the possible success of the claims on the merits; (2) the relative harm to the
parties; and (3) any unnecessary delays in bringing the claims. 36 The Court
emphasized that the State has a significant interest in carrying out criminal
judgments.37 Further, the Court noted that last-minute claims create a strong
presumption against the issuance of a stay of execution.3"
The Court reasoned that its decision will not trigger an influx of method-of-
execution claims and last-minute stay requests because of a court's power not to






33. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
34. 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
35. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (citing Gomez v. United States Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653,
654 (1992) (per curiam)).
36. Id. at 2126.
37. Id.
38. Id. It is unclear whether Nelson could have brought his challenge any earlier. The prison
officials only notified Nelson six days prior to his execution that they would make a two-inch
incision in his arm or leg in order to gain venous access. Id. at 2121.
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issue a stay of execution and the limited nature of the Nelson holding.39 Further,
the Court noted that the Prison Reform Litigation Act ("PRLA") also protects
the State and courts from prisoners who engage in abusive litigation.4 The
Court stated that the PRLA commands courts to dismiss claims brought under
§ 1983 if the claim is " 'frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from [] relief.' ,4I Also, the PRLA instructs courts to examine whether granting
relief on the claim would adversely affect the criminal justice system and requires
inmates to exhaust all state remedies prior to filing their § 1983 claims. 42 Thus,
various procedural and substantive hurdles exist before a federal court may rule
on the merits of a prisoner's 5 1983 claim.43
IV. Application in Virginia
Regarding the cut-down procedure, Nelson has had little impact in Virginia
because the Virginia Department of Corrections does not permit the use of the
procedure in executions.4 However, the Supreme Court did not limit its holding
to cut-down procedures. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have applied
Nelson's holding to § 1983 claims challenging the chemical "cocktail" used in a
State's lethal injection protocol.4" Other possible issues to raise under § 1983
include the use of non-medical professionals in administering the lethal injection,
the failure to use a saline solution in the protocol, the lack of written procedures
for prison officials performing the injection, and the use of inappropriate
amounts of chemicals in the protocol.46
39. Id at 2125-26.
40. Id at 2126; see Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), 3626, and in scattered sections of 28 and 42
U.S.C.) (enacting certain requirements for prisoners prior to seeking injunctive relief against prison
officials in federal court).
41. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2126 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 199 7 e(c)(1) (2000)).
42. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (2000)).
43. Id
44. Brief for Applicants at 3 n.1, Johnson v. Reid, 2004 WL 1784349, No. 04A-87 (U.S.
August 11, 2004) (on file with author); see Supreme Court Ljfts Killer's Stay of Execution, DAILY PRESS
(Richmond, Va.), Aug. 12,2004, at C5, available at2004 WL 85878821 (stating that Virginia does not
permit the use of the cut-down procedure).
45. See Reid v. Johnson, 105 Fed. Appx. 500, 503 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the con-
demned inmate could challenge Virginia's lethal injection protocol under § 1983); Harris v.Johnson,
376 F.3d 414,416 (5th Cir. 2004) (observing that a § 1983 claim may be appropriate for challenging
the chemical combination in Texas's lethal injection protocol).
46. See general# Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubing Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63,
105-25 (2002) (discussing possible Eighth Amendment challenges to lethal injection protocols).
20041
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The Court limited its holding to claims that do not necessarily imply the
invalidity of a State's method of execution." A claim is cognizable under 5 1983
if there is a possibility that the inmate's prevailing on the claim will not affect the
State's ability to perform the execution.' The Court stated that Nelson could
challenge the cut-down procedure with a § 1983 claim if the State could access
Nelson's veins in a different manner.49 However, the Court added that if Ala-
bama had no alternative procedures, then Nelson's claim would fall outside of
the Court's holding.' Arguably, attorneys challenging execution procedures after
the denial of their clients' federal habeas corpus petitions must propose accept-
able alternative execution procedures when framing their § 1983 claims in order
to avoid the possibility of the court construing the claim as a general method of
execution challenge.
Virginia has not codified its lethal injection procedures and did not disclose
the procedures until recently."' Nelson stated that "[ilf... the cut-down were a
statutorily mandated part of the lethal injection protocol... [the Director of the
Alabama Department of Corrections] might have a stronger argument that
success on the merits ... would call into question the death sentence itself.
5 -2
Thus, even if a procedure is physically unnecessary to perform the execution,
courts may treat a procedure as necessary if a statute mandates the use of that
procedure. 3 Unlike Alabama prisoners, condemned prisoners in Virginia will not
have the problem of filing § 1983 claims that challenge statutorily mandated
execution procedures. For instance, the Virginia legislature has not mandated
who administers lethal injections, and Virginia arguably has alternatives to using
non-medical professionals for administering injections.5' Thus, a prisoner could
use § 1983 to challenge Virginia's use of non-medical professionals in administer-
ing lethal injections, even though Alabama prisoners may not be able to use
47. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
48. See id at 2124-25 (stating that a prisoner may challenge the lawfulness of a search using
5 1983 because a finding that the search was unlawful may not necessarily imply that conviction was
unlawful).
49. Id at 2124.
50. See id. at 2123 ("Mmposition of the death penalty presupposes a means of carrying it
out.").
51. See Reid, 105 Fed. Appx. at 503 (holding that Reid could challenge Virginia's lethal
injection protocol under § 1983).
52. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2123-24.
53. Id
54. The American Medical Association does not permit members to participate in executions.
DENNO, supra note 46, at 112 (citing Council on Ethical and Jud. Affairs, AMA, Coucil Rep.,
P ysidan Participation in Capital Punisbment, 270 JAMA 365, 365 (1993)). Thus, States may need to
use non-medical professionals for lethal injections.
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1983 because an Alabama statute mandates that the Warden or an employee of
the Department of Corrections administer lethal injections.s 5
Nelson held that stating a § 1983 claim does not entitle the prisoner to a
temporary stay of execution. 6 When deciding whether to grant a stay, the Court
instructed lower courts to consider the possible success of the claims, the relative
harm to the parties, and any unnecessary delays in bringing the claims.5 7 Particu-
larly, the Court stated that courts will regard last-minute claims with suspicion. 8
In Harris v. Johnson,"9 the Fifth Circuit denied a petitioner's § 1983 claim challeng-
ing Texas's lethal injection protocol because the petitioner filed it ten weeks prior
to his execution date.' Thus, attorneys should file § 1983 claims well before a
prisoner's execution date in order to give courts time to decide the claims on the
merits.
V. Conclusion
The Court limited its holding to § 1983 claims that do not necessarily
challenge the method of execution.6" When asserting a § 1983 claim, attorneys
must focus their claims to avoid challenging the method of execution in general.
Further, the filing of a cognizable § 1983 claim does not necessarily warrant a stay
of execution.62 Thus, attorneys should file § 1983 claims as soon as possible in
order to give courts enough time to decide the claims on the merits and to avoid
the appearance of having filed the claim solely as a means of obtaining a stay of
execution.
Justin B. Shane
55. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82 (Supp. 2003) (stating that the Warden or an employee shall
administer the lethal injection). Seegeneral/y DENNO, supra note 46, at 112-16 (discussing physician
involvement in lethal injections).
56. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
57. Id at 2126.
58. Id at 2125-26 (citing Gomer6, 503 U.S. at 654). The Court in Gomez vacated the stay of
execution because Gomez brought a § 1983 claim, challenging the constitutionality of execution by
gas chamber, ten days prior to his execution when it could have been brought almost a decade
earlier. Id. (citing Gomet, 503 U.S. at 654).
59. 376 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2004).
60. Harris, 376 F.3d at 415-16.
61. Nelson, 124 S. Ct. at 2124.
62. Id. at 2126.
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